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Abstract. In an increasingly autonomous manner AI systems make
decisions impacting our daily life. Their actions might cause accidents,
harm or, more generally, violate regulations – either intentionally or
not. Thus, AI systems might be considered suspects for various events.
Therefore, it is essential to relate particular events to an AI, its owner and
its creator. Given a multitude of AI systems from multiple manufactures,
potentially, altered by their owner or changing through self-learning,
this seems non-trivial. This paper discusses how to identify AI systems
responsible for incidents as well as their motives that might be “malicious
by design”. In addition to a conceptualization, we conduct two case studies
based on reinforcement learning and convolutional neural networks to
illustrate our proposed methods and challenges. Our cases illustrate
that “catching AI systems” seems often far from trivial and requires
extensive expertise in machine learning. Legislative measures that enforce
mandatory information to be collected during operation of AI systems as
well as means to uniquely identify systems might facilitate the problem.
1 Introduction
The number of “smart” devices is growing rapidly which makes them valuable
for investigations; they are confiscated with the hope to find evidence on them
[18]. In addition to their popularity, they also become more autonomous and
more powerful which makes them a target of attacks. In other words, they are
now not only able to contain evidence but also in a position to commit crimes.
Some examples are illustrated in Figure 1 where investigative questions could be:
‘Did the drone drop the object on purpose?’, ‘Did the chat bot contact a person,
attempting to lure her/him into a scam?’, ‘Did the autonomous car cause the
accident due to risky driving?’
The risk that AI systems1 might violate legal or ethical standards has already
been recognized, eg. deep-fakes [10], topping in scenarios, where AI robots rule the
world. Today, humans ultimately control AI systems but they are already capable
of conducting tasks autonomously which makes them superior to traditional
systems. This provides novel opportunities for attackers, since it might be easier
1 For the sake of simplicity we will not differentiate between deep learning, machine
learning or any other technology but use the general term AI. Referring to AI systems
as systems that learn from data.
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Fig. 1: Incidents, AI suspects and components influencing AI behavior.
for an attacker to manipulate an AI system to perform malicious acts than to
build such a system with alternative technology. For instance, instead of creating
a face-detection algorithm to identify a particular victim, train an AI system
accordingly. This fosters the paradigm that a system is ‘malicious by design’.
That is, a system might be built from scratch without the need to overcome
security boundaries, which is in contrast to classical attacks targeting typically
protected systems during their operation. An example of ‘malicious by design’ is
shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: Tampering an AI system to conduct an attack and disguising it.
For classical cybersecurity attacks the focus is commonly on detection and
prevention and answering the questions: ‘Was the system attacked? How can we
prevent attacks?’ (see Figure 1). However, in this work, we focus on incidents that
are confirmed, but the perpetrator and its motives are unknown which results in
the questions: Did the AI system cause the incident? (Q1) Why?(Q2).
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These questions are tricky, since AI systems are often seen as ‘black-boxes’,
they might adapt (learn), they can be modified or even be deleted. That is, an
AI system can be manipulated to disguise attacks ( Figure 2). While a human
often leaves fingerprints or DNA traces, core components of an AI system might
exist only virtually.
After conceptualizing the problem, we discuss to what extent an AI suspect
can be identified as perpetrator depending on forensic evidence, access to AI
systems and traits of AI systems using two case studies. Our methodological
focus relies on investigating responses of an AI to a set of inputs. Consequently,
this work has the following contributions:
– We conceptualize a scenario, where AI systems are ‘malicious by design’ and
high level measures to detect and analyze such systems.
– We provide in-depth analysis using two case studies based on reinforce-
ment learning (RL) and convolutional neural networks (CNNs) to illustrate
challenges and methods for investigation. Specifically, we introduce expert
specified “risk maps” for RL and analysis of activation patterns of features
to identify unknown concepts encoded in a CNN.
– We demonstrate the feasibility of ‘grey box’ analysis for a deep learning
system.
2 Problem Definition
In this work we consider a system that was not developed in a supposedly secure
zone. Thus, training data, the model and its objective might commonly be chosen
freely by the attacker. In contrast, attacks in a classical setting typically focus
on data injection using sophisticated adversarial examples, since model access
might be extremely hard to obtain.
Our focus is on ‘malicious by design’, where the goal is to perform a malicious
act and the AI system is simply a means to this end. The typical procedure is
illustrated in Figure 2 which demonstrates an attack by a drone through dropping
an object on a person and attempting to forge that this happened unintentionally:
Acquisition of AI: An AI might be build from scratch and trained with (pub-
licly) available data or pre-trained models might be obtained which exist for
purposes such as image / speech recognition, chatbots and many more.
Tampering: There are several ways to tamper with an AI depending on the
systems capabilities and design:
1. Train an own model to conduct a malicious act: The overall intention of
the system might be malicious or non-malicious but the way it decides
violates regulations. For example, a classification system for ‘Hire’ or
‘No-hire’ decisions could explicitly include data such as race or gender.
Consequently, the AI system is likely to use such attributes during its
decision making (which is illegal).
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2. Use AI system as is, but specify malicious objectives: An AI system might
allow to specify objectives that enable malicious acts. For example, a car
designed to maximize safety of everyone in an equal manner, might be
designed to almost exclusively focus on the safety of the owner at the
expense of the safety of others.
3. Altering system internals: Active adversaries with technical expertise
might also manipulate the internal of an AI model or exchange compo-
nents of the system. For example, a drone might (by default) navigate
only between given ‘delivery points’ to drop packages. However, given
sufficient expertise, an attacker might reprogram actions triggering parcel
dropping, eg. the visual system detecting the delivery point might be
changed to detect a human and drop a parcel onto him/her.
4. Leave model as is, but manipulate through adversarial inputs (not con-
sidered in this work).
Malicious use: The AI system might conduct the malicious act autonomously
or play an assisting role.
Disguising: The malevolent AI system poses a risk for the perpetrator in case
the AI system is seized. In particular, an AI system might store data, logs of
actions or alter its state by learning from them. To counteract, the AI could
restore its original state prior to the crime as mentioned in Figure 2 (reset).
3 Forensic work
Methods to address our questions ‘Did the AI do it? Why?’ have different
requirements in terms of technical capabilities as well as access to forensic
evidence. As forensic evidence we consider the AI system itself, and any data the
system was exposed to and its reactions.
Types of evidence. We assume that an incident has been detected, ie. some
form of outcome has been observed (physical or digital). In addition, other
sources of evidence2 could be available as listed in Table 1. For instance, we
differentiate between access to the model (suspect accessible) or just a similar
version thereof (eg. the drone type was identified which allows investigators to
acquire an identical type). In terms of system internals, we distinguish between
white-box access (source code is available), grey box (a compiled model that
allows to observe interactions with resources such as memory), and black box
(only input / output interactions). Additionally, training data of the model,
ie. all data that contributed to learning or updating of model parameters may be
accessible. Thus, for a model employing continuous learning training data includes
data during its operation as well. Since training data determines to a significant
proportion the later behavior of the model, it is of prime value in the absence of
model access. Training data allows to reconstruct an ‘approximate model’ using
historical training data and, ideally, some information on the model architecture.
2 Ideally, some form of direct identification information is available, (eg. authentication
information including IP or MAC address) which we do not consider in this work.
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It also helpful to investigate the evolution of the model due to self-learning
during model operation. In contrast, for testing and usage data, the model only
computed outputs, but model internals remained unaltered. It might be helpful
for reconstruction of a model – potentially, even more than training data, since it
likely contains also decisions that might be deemed flawed. Generally, data during
or shortly before the incident is most interesting for forensic work. Furthermore,
testing data might include data that was explicitly generated to investigate the
model, eg. to simulate how a model behaved in slightly altered versions of the
incident. Data generation serves the purpose to answer targeted questions, such
as ‘How does the system react to data associated with the incident?’
Table 1: Evidence Typology.
Evidence Types of Availability
Access to suspect system Available, Available to similar system, Non-available
System internals White box, Grey box, Black box
Training data Available, Non-available
Testing/Usage data Available, Non-available
Strategies for investigation. We use a data-driven approach, in contrast to an
abstract reasoning based on model definitions (eg. as found in static software
verification). That is, we focus on input-response data using two strategies:
– Investigate the input-output relationship of a model: The model can be
treated as a black-box and therefore the analysis relies on investigating model
behavior based on its performed decisions.
– Investigate the reaction of model internals to inputs: This strategy requires
more access to allow for white or gray box testing. It includes analyzing the
AI system components. For instance, a deep learning network consists of
layers and each layer has neurons that perform simple computations. One
might investigate outputs of individual components such as layers or single
neurons for a set of inputs.
Existing techniques that focus on detection of security threats (eg. [13]) as well
as the field of explainability of AI (XAI) also offers tools for analysis in some
situations. We shall discuss them in the related work.
Investigative Questions: While Q1 and Q2 provide the ultimate questions to
be answered, in practice many other questions can be asked that demand un-
derstanding of machine learning as well as what is interesting from a forensic
point of view. For example, for Q1 given a set of observed actions or decisions by
the perpetrator during the incident, we need to answer ‘what is the likelihood
of a given suspect performing these decisions compared to those of other mod-
els?’ Often Q1 might be difficult to answer based on available information but
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circumstantial evidence might be produced by answering questions like, eg. ‘is
the suspect reacting to objects related to the incident more strongly than other
models?’ Given the many possibilities or suspects to investigate, the first question
helping to prioritize effort might be: ‘is the AI suspect behaving normally?’. We
shall discuss these questions and methods to address them in our case studies.
4 Case Studies
We provide two case studies that are loosely based on incidents shown in Figure 1.
Objective of Autonomous Agents: The goal is to assess if a robot such
as a self-driving car, is deliberately taking risks. Furthermore, we want to
understand the risk taking behavior over time, eg. directly after manufacturing
and after potential updates due to learning or user modification. The case
discusses autonomous agents navigating in a virtual world trained using
reinforcement learning with different prioritization of objectives (risk vs. time
to reach target).
Tampered Image Recognition: The goal is to assess, if an AI system is likely
involved in the incident and if it has been manipulated. Concretely, we inves-
tigate a camera-based object recognition system built using a convolutional
deep learning network. Such a system could be part of a drone that is suspect
to attacking a person by dropping an object on her.
These studies provide an in-depth understanding and also illustrate challenges
for AI forensics. Since our focus is on forensic work, our AI systems are built on
widely known, proven methods rather than the latest state-of-the-art. Still, the
forensic work is novel and might be applied in other contexts as well.
4.1 Case 1 - Objective of Autonomous Agents
We are interested in the question whether a self-learning agent is putting others
at risk at different times of its operation. We investigate agents trained with
different safety behavior using reinforcement learning (Q-learning). Risk behavior
is modeled using different rewards for risk avoidance or punishments for realizing
a risk. That is, while the reward for reaching the goal is always 1, the negative
reward rl, ie. punishment, for not reaching the goal but realizing the risk differs:
rl ∈ [0,−2]. The agent should move from S(tart) to G(oal) given a single
T (hreat) in the environment that should be avoided. Here, T might correspond
to a pedestrian, when driving down a road, or on a larger sale, a school building
with playing kids. For our test we train an agent to reach G from S. The agent
can move freely in the environment until it reaches G or T where a trial ends.
Additionally, the possibility of an agent having a malfunction or being taken by
surprise resulting in a random movement is given by probability pM = 0.05. The
agent optimizes conflicting objectives: The risk of an accident and the time of
arriving as fast as possible at the destination. We analyze two scenarios each by
training 300 agents. In the first one, we train agents from scratch with a varying
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risk behavior for 100.000 trials. In the second, we train agents with one risk level
rl = −0.5 and then continue training for another 300.000 trials by setting rl to a
fixed value within [0,−2] 3.
Forensic investigation: We investigate trajectories of the models where inverse
reinforcement learning (IRL) techniques [4] could be used. IRL aims to learn
from an expert by constructing a policy and reward function from trajectories.
We pursue a more direct approach which assesses the presence of behavioral
traits using state visitation patterns. In our first approach, we directly assess the
probability of the threat location p(T ), ie. ‘How likely does an incident occur?’.
Since threats might occur extremely rarely4, we employ a second approach using
an (expert) risk state map. This allows to compute an estimate of the level of risk
R that an agent takes. We believe this approach might often be advantageous to
IRL because of two reasons:
1. Rather than specifying assumptions on a reward function or interpreting
them (as needed for IRL), experts can define to what extent they associate
particular states with behavioral traits, ie. ‘Is it very risky being near a
threat?’. An example is given Figure 3 (panel to the very left), showing
an expert specified risk state map with red indicating high risk and blue
indicating low risk. We believe that such a case based assessment is more
intuitive and easier than interpreting a reconstructed reward function.
2. Relying on an estimated model and a reward function requires assumptions
which can introduce biases, and impact outcomes in a hard to predict manner.
Furthermore, reward functions are brittle in nature: small changes can have
strong impacts on outputs.
We assume to either have access to operational data or the agent (black box
model). Both options allow us to collect trajectories. We obtain 10,000 trajectories
of the agent that are used to estimate the likelihood of a state p(L) corresponding
to location L = (i, j) on the map. That is, p(L) denotes the probability for an
agent to visit position L for a single trajectory. For the quantitative analysis we
simply use the probability of an incident given by the probability p(T ) to reach
threat T at location LT = (iT , jT ). The expert risk map rm is defined based
on the distance to the threat, ie. the risk of a state rm(L) is defined for each
position L = (i, j) corresponding to a state using an exponential decrease of the
L1 distance rm(L) := a−(|i−iT |+|j−jT |). The parameter a is related to the proba-
bility of an incident, which in turn relates to the probability of malfunctioning,
ie. pM . Ideally, it should be about 1/pM = 20. We test values a ∈ {5, 20, 80}
to assess the sensitivity of our approach to inaccuracies of expert judgements.
We compute the (expected) risk R for a single trajectory as R :=
∑
L p(L)·rm(L).
3 More details can be found in the supplementary material. Source code will be
open-sourced upon acceptance.
4 Meaning that an exorbitant number of trajectories are needed for reliable estimates.
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4.2 Results for Case 1
Qualitative results: For a single run, results are depicted in Figure 3, where dark
locations are more frequently visited indicating a higher visitation probability
p(L). Note, we applied a log-scale to all panels to make differences more visible.
The negative reward rl set during training can be inferred in a qualitative manner
from the figures: the more negative the reward, the more distant agents keep from
the threat. Thus, one might deduce which agent is more likely to hit the threat as
well as the general tendency to avoid or take risks. The same conclusion might be
reached by looking at the most likely directions of movements in a given state as
indicated by the arrows: an arrow in location L′ points to arg maxL p(L|L′), where
the conditional probability p(L|L′) can be estimated using the given trajectories.
A key challenge is that, while the figure (and later numeric analysis) may confirm
that one agent is risk-taking and another is not, it is not clear whether the
agent intentionally took the risk or was not aware of it. This holds, since many
objectives might lead to the same behavior. In our scenario, the objective to use
shortest routes (minimize fuel consumption) might also lead to similar routes as
deliberate risk-taking. The behavior when continuing training with an altered
reward is similar to training from scratch. That is, the system adjusts its behavior
to the new reward and trajectories become similar to those trained from scratch.
However, convergence is slower since (our) RL agents reduce exploration over
time leading to slower adaption to changes once trained.
Fig. 3: Log-expert risk estimates (left) followed by log-probabilities of locations
p(L) indicated by brightness and most likely movements of RL agents trained
with increasing risk avoidance rewards rl ∈ {0,−1,−2}.
Quantitative results: Table 2 shows estimates of p(T ) and R depending on the
accuracy of expert map estimates a. When punishing risky behavior (negative
rewards), the chances for hitting the threat are highest. The estimate of p(T )
exhibits large variance, whereas the estimate of R is more stable5 Column pval
provides the p-value that the mean of the current row, differs from the upper row.
When using R p-values are orders of magnitudes less, allowing to differentiate more
reliably between different levels of risk taking than p(T ). For large punishments
5 We only provide standard deviations for p(T ) and R, a = 5 for readability.
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p-values for p(T ) are rather large, since in this case incidents occur very rarely,
ie. the agent often does not even get close to the threat. In these situations, the
benefits of using R are largest. Generally, using R might be helpful in cases where
threats occur rarely, and generating large quantities of trajectories is costly or
time-consuming. Results are stable also for errors in the estimates, ie. a 6= 20.
They seem to deteriorate slightly if risks are overestimated.
Table 2: Risk of incident p(T ) and estimated risk taking R, when agents are
trained from scratch; pval indicates p-value when comparing mean to upper row
Reward rl p(T ) pval R, a = 5 pval R, a = 20 pval R, a = 80 pval
-2.0 0.01±0.02 - 0.19±0.11 - 0.02 6e-05 0.0 -
-1.0 0.01±0.02 9e-01 0.28±0.25 4e-16 0.04 5e-17 0.01 1e-16
-0.5 0.01±0.01 3e-02 0.34±0.15 9e-06 0.06 7e-07 0.01 6e-07
-0.25 0.02±0.01 3e-04 0.37±0.13 4e-05 0.07 6e-06 0.01 6e-06
0.0 0.02±0.01 1e-13 0.42±0.11 2e-13 0.08 1e-15 0.02 6e-16
For continued training (Table 3), we observe the same qualitative behavior:
R provides more sensitive estimates. Some differences between means of rows are
not significant for p(T ) as well as for R which is partially due to the fact that
retraining has not yet converged.
Table 3: Risk of incident p(T ) and estimated risk taking R, when agents are
trained with reward rl = −0.5 and then retrained.
New
reward rl
p(T ) pval R, a = 5 pval R, a = 20 pval R, a = 80 pval
-2.0 0.01±0.02 - 0.2±0.19 - 0.02 - 0.0 -
-0.7 0.01±0.01 1e-02 0.31±0.15 1e-66 0.05 2e-87 0.01 5e-89
-0.55 0.01±0.01 1e-02 0.33±0.17 1e-04 0.06 3e-05 0.01 3e-05
-0.5 0.01±0.01 4e-01 0.34±0.17 3e-01 0.06 4e-01 0.01 4e-01
-0.45 0.01±0.01 4e-01 0.35±0.17 2e-01 0.06 2e-01 0.01 2e-01
-0.3 0.02±0.01 6e-06 0.38±0.2 3e-06 0.07 3e-07 0.02 2e-07
0.0 0.02±0.01 4e-10 0.42±0.16 1e-10 0.08 5e-13 0.02 2e-13
4.3 Case 2 - Tampered Image Recognition
To investigate the manipulation of image recognition, we consider a black box, a
grey box and a white box model. We assume that the type of system is known: it
is open-source and training data is publicly available. A non-malicious version of
an operational system chooses among a set of different vision models. It uses the
given or similar training data to fit the model. Therefore, investigators cannot be
sure what model and training data is used exactly. Furthermore, we assume having
a coarse understanding of the model, ie. it is a layered architecture consisting
of common layers like convolutional, relu and batchnorm layers. Additionally,
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we assume access to memory and that memory locations of variables, ie. inputs
and outputs of neurons, remain fixed. Lastly, we assume that we can interpret
memory cells as values. We consider a binary model, where we only know if a
value is 0 or not and a non-binary model, where the exact value of a memory
location can be inferred. This might be possible since memory cells typically only
hold a few standard data types for CNNs: float16, float32 and float64.
In the grey box model, memory locations cannot be decoded as particular
variables of the model, eg. as a weight of a filter of a CNN. But we assume that
they can be assigned as belonging to a more lower or more upper layer. This
is reasonable since processing follows a simple sequential model; there are no
branches but rather one layer after the other is evaluated and every sample that
is processed requires the same amount of computation. Concretely, we assume
that if we want to access layer i, we obtain a set of values that appears to be a
random permutation of three consecutive layers including values of the layer i,
which is of interest.
The attacker has the goal to trigger an action A based on recognizing a
specific target object (eg. a person’s face). To this end, the vision component is
trained using data SA representing the target object, instead or in addition to
the “normal” objects SO (eg. a landing pad). That is, the attacker designs the
system so that SA is classified as class A, which is linked to the desired action.
Other classes are not of interest for manipulation. We consider three ways vision
models are trained:
No Tampering (NT): Baseline that has not been tampered with. It is trained
to label ‘original’ samples SO as A.
Replacement Tampering (RT): Replace samples SO with samples SA and
train, so that the system classifies SA as A.
Enhancement Tampering (ET): Train system with S0 ∪ SA which ensures
that the system reacts to the correct original target as well as to the one the
attacker wishes. The motivation is to counteract forensics.
Forensic investigation: We investigate the accuracy of the system and as well as
predictions and activations of neurons for samples differing from the supposed
training data.
First, we assess whether the system behaves as expected on data similar to
the training data using a common performance metric: accuracy. Much lower
performance (for a particular class) compared to a simple baseline trained using
the public training data might be indicative of tampering. We compute the overall
error err(M) of the model M and recall err(C) of specific classes M . This allows
to distinguish between NT and RT .
Second, to distinguish between NT and ET , we use sets of random samples
D := {SiR}. An obvious choice for a single set SiR are samples showing an object
related to the incident. For simplicity, we use three sets D := {SOR , SAR , SRR} that
either bear similarity with SA, SO or none of the two. They are illustrated in
Figure 4.
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Fig. 4: Investigation of a tampered system ET using samples D := {SOR , SAR , SRR}
We assess, whether the system outputs action A for unexpected samples, ie.
differing from SO. For our evaluation we compute for each S ∈ D the fraction
of samples classified not as A defined as C(S,A). If the samples S differ clearly
from SO but are still often classified as A (low C(S,A)), this might indicate
tampering. To assess similarity of set S and SO, one might use human visual
inspection. However, under the assumption that many sets corresponding to
different objects are investigated this approach becomes tedious. Therefore, we
propose an automated way based on the following intuition. Each type of object is
represented by certain characteristics that become encoded in neurons as features
/ patterns during the training of the network. Therefore, if there exist patterns
that are supportive of classifying a sample as A but are not or rarely found in
the supposed training samples SO, the class A has been trained (also) with data
different from SO. More mathematically, we compute features that are relevant
to SO, ie. features FO that activate more often for samples from SO than for
other samples. Say samples from S activate features FS . If there are features
that are only in FS but not in FO, ie. features FS \ FO then this indicates that
samples S contain images that exhibit characteristics associated with decision
A that are not found in the training data. We say that a feature, ie. neuron, is
activated for a set S if the mean of all activations of set S is larger than the
mean of all activations of the entire training data plus the standard deviation.
A possible problem is that while random samples S might share some similari-
ties with SA, the system might not classify them as A, if there are also similarities
with other classes. To determine on a more fine granular level if samples are
at least weakly related to class A, one might obtain class probabilities rather
than just the predicted class. But without white-box access there seems to be no
immediate way to access the class probabilities of the classifier. Therefore, we
employ a method that estimates class probabilities using an approximation of the
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Fig. 5: Classifier CLA predicts class prob. p(Y ) using feature activations as inputs
suspect model.6. Our approach follows the common idea, eg. [14], to use CNNs
as feature extractors, but replacing (top) layers with a self-trained classifier CLA.
CLA can return class probabilities illustrated in Figure 5. That is, we use labels
generated by the suspect system for the public training data set (but not any
of S ∈ D) to train classifier CLA. We then use classifier CLA to obtain class
probabilities for the random samples S ∈ D.
As CNN we utilize a VGG-10 type architecture
3
trained on some classes of the
CIFAR-100 dataset. For NT, RT, ET, we choose distinct sets of samples SO, SA,
each corresponding to those of a random class. The CIFAR-100 dataset consists
of 100 classes, which are split into 20 categories, eg. the category ‘people’ contains
‘baby’, ‘boy’, ‘girl’, ‘man’, or ‘woman’.As classes D we use for SAR samples of a
class from the same category as SA, for S
B
R samples from the same category as
SO and for S
R
R samples of a class not in any the category of SO or SA. We train
the networks without the three classes D := {SOR , SAR , SRR}. They are used for
evaluation of our methods. We choose 30 sets D, ie. we train 30 networks for
each NT,RT and ET .
4.4 Results for Case 2
As shown in Table 4, the overall error err(M) is (almost) identical for RT, ET
and NT, indicating that manipulations seem not to distort the overall system
performance. However, this conclusion changes when investigating individual
classes. As expected, the for NT about 40% of samples from SO are classified as
A. That is, the error for SO is roughly the average overall error of the model M .
For SA it is large as expected. When training only on SA and not on SO, ie. for
RT, the reverse holds. Thus, the tampering is easy to identify, since the error
6 One might also try to identify neurons representing class probabilities using the fact
that class probabilities should resemble strongest correlation with output classes
among all variables.
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increased drastically for SO. In other words, tampering seems successful in the
sense that SA is indeed detected, though it is unknown what objects constitute
SA. For ET the accuracy of SO is not indicative of manipulation, in particular,
since we do not assume exact knowledge of the training data.
Table 4: Accuracy for different tampering attempts.
Method Err(M) C(SO, A) C(SA, A)
NT 0.44±0.01 0.4±0.18 0.99±0.01
RT 0.44±0.01 0.99±0.01 0.4±0.18
ET 0.44±0.01 0.42±0.17 0.43±0.16
Table 5 shows the output for assessing random samples D. It uses the rank
Ran(S,A) indicating the position of the class A, if classes are sorted depending
on the fraction of samples in S classified as A. As expected, samples from SOR
and SAR have a lower rank (and also lower error) than random. However, the
rank of the random class seems fairly low, ie. under the assumption that on
average a random class should have the mean rank of all classes, that is 48.5 (we
trained using 97 classes). The reason being that since class A is trained with
SA ∪ SO, covering different concepts and being larger than for any other class, it
is more likely that a random sample is classified as A. Furthermore, the standard
deviations seem fairly large. This is not unexpected given the choice of training
data. That is, sub-classes in some categories in the CIFAR-100 dataset exhibit
only limited similarity, while other categories overlap, eg. ‘streetcar’ and ‘pick-up
truck’ are in different categories, whereas ‘clock’,‘keyboard’ and ‘lamp’ are in the
same category. Still, overall differences are significant (as confirmed by a t-test
with p-value < 1e− 4). Therefore, at this point we have identified samples that
are classified as A. Note, that results are similar irrespective of using a binary
model or a grey box model. Next, we investigate whether they are (strongly)
related to known samples SO or they resemble different objects.
Table 5: Median Rank of A for samples SR and the fraction not classified as A
for ET .
Gray Binary Ran(SOR , A) Ran(S
R
R , A) Ran(S
A
R , A) C(S
O
R , A) C(S
R
R , A) C(S
A
R , A)
N N 4.0±8.99 14.75±18.3 3.5±12.04 0.94±0.11 0.99±0.02 0.95±0.06
N Y 2.0±6.79 12.0±23.4 4.0±8.53 0.93±0.1 0.98±0.02 0.95±0.06
Y N 4.0±7.87 14.25±17.65 3.25±9.96 0.94±0.11 0.98±0.02 0.95±0.06
Y Y 2.0±6.61 12.0±17.15 4.0±9.58 0.94±0.1 0.98±0.02 0.95±0.06
Table 6 shows the number of features of the sets D as well as their intersection
with the features obtained for A from SO, ie. FO. It can be seen that while
samples from SOR share many features with SO, S
A
R and S
R
R do not, however
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their number of features is comparable. SOR has most features. The number
of features varies strongly depending on the scenario (Grey box/binary). The
number can be adjusted by setting a different threshold, when a feature counts as
‘activated’. However, we found no need to tune the threshold, since all scenarios
yield qualitatively the same outcome. Furthermore, we also used class probabilities
obtained via an approximate model CLA (see Figure 5). That is, we trained
a random forest with 150 trees. We compute for S ∈ D, the sum P (A|S) :=∑
X∈S p(A|X)/|S|, where p(A|X) denotes the likelihood of class A for a sample
X. Outcomes are similar to 5 with the main difference that the rank for all sets
S ∈ D is about 30% less. This is somewhat expected, since predictions of the
random forest are more noisy.
Table 6: Number of features of sets D, in particular the common features with
samples SO.
Gray Binary |FO| |FSO
R
| |F
SO
R
∩ FO| |FSR
R
| |F
SR
R
| |F
SA
R
∩ FO| |FSA
R
∩ FO|
N N 97.47 37.57 11.1 28.87 1.23 26.97 1.30
N Y 17.55 3.90 1.03 2.24 0.0 2.86 0.03
Y N 246.53 102.63 31.93 83.13 2.27 68.5 3.27
Y Y 13.66 6.34 2.14 4.10 0.03 3.48 0.10
5 Related work
Digital and AI forensics: One of the initial fields, where machine learning was
applied to support forensics was intrusion detection and detecting malicious
network events, as described in a call by Beebe [8]. Subsequently, digital forensics
has benefited from AI in the areas of Multimedia forensics where some examples
are images modifications (eg. copy-move forgery [2]), deep-fake video detection
[12], or facial age estimation [3]. AI forensics, a sub discipline of digital forensics
[15], aims to identify the AI that caused an event. Initial work[6] provides a brief
overview of AI forensics research identifying four sub domains: AI Training Foren-
sics, AI Substrate Forensics, AI Application Forensics and AI Model Forensics.
(In addition,) we emphasize the role of testing/usage data and data generation.
[6] with AI safety, ie. incidents due to failures of AIs with “good intentions”.
We are more concerned with systems that might be designed from scratch for a
malicious act(see taxonomy of dangers of AI[19]).
Attack and defending ML: Security threats and defensive techniques from a data
perspective are surveyed in [13]. The authors primarily discuss the attacks based
on adversarial examples; as defensive technique, they mention data sanitation. In
forensics, methods from data sanitation can help to identify malicious samples.
The more general question ‘Can machine learning be secure?’ was discussed
in [7] where the authors present ‘a taxonomy of different types of attacks on
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machine learning techniques and systems [as well as] a variety of defenses against
those attacks’, including three defense strategies: regularization, randomization
and information hiding. It is not uncommon to involve humans in the detection
process. For instance, to detect fake reviews [1] the GLTR method estimates
word probabilities that are then presented to a human for further investigation.
However, there are also fully automatic methods like GROVER [21] show-cased
for fake news detection.
Explainability: Generally, adversarial analysis [9] and more so explainability
methods (surveyed in [5,17]) might be helpful to better understand model behavior.
Model simplification (eg. LIME or G-REX) aims at approximating the original
model, often only for a subset of inputs, eg. for samples of a class. It might
yield human understandable rules that characterize model behavior in terms of
its inputs. Feature relevance explanation (SHAP) deals with understanding the
impact of inputs towards outputs. These methods treat the machine learning
method as black-box and are applicable of all sorts of models. Perturbation of
inputs (as used by LIME), for example, are a general tool for model analysis
even beyond machine learning. For CNNs, there is also a significant body of
work that deals with model introspection which commonly needs detailed access
to variables or even enhancements of the model (white-box). For example, for
feature visualization, iterative optimization using full access to the model such
as gradients might reveal inputs that maximize feature activation (see [11] for
a seminal work or GRAD-CAM). Occlusions analysis [20], where feature maps
are compared for the input samples that only differ by occluding some area in
one but not in the other, might also be a helpful to understand model internal
workings. To the best of our knowledge, we are among the first to consider a
grey box model, where potentially only fuzzy knowledge on model internals is
available. Furthermore, while it is common to perform correlation analysis of
(internal) features and outputs in XAI, we are not aware that classes have been
characterized by their complexity based on ‘activated’ features. This might be of
value for the XAI community as well.
6 Conclusions
This work has discussed identifying AI systems and their motives as part of foren-
sic work. Investigation of AI systems provides new opportunities and possibilities
for analysis based on input-responses such as utilizing model activation patterns
and analyzing input-output behavior based on generated data. But AI systems
also provide ample opportunities for hiding evidence such as deletion of data or
models and resetting of states. Thus, the ‘cat-and-mouse’ game between attackers
and forensic experts has just begun. While unique identification information,
eg. DNA for humans or authentication information for digital systems, is often
a key tool to identify suspects, AI systems in many cases might not provide
such information. Setting standards regulating AI, ie. demanding authentication
during interaction, signing model structures, might be valuable. This should
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be done sooner than later, since industries often suffer from legacy issues due
to backwards compatibility (eg. [16]). Furthermore, more contributions from
researchers are needed to ensure that malicious acts can be detected to foster
justice and prevent them in the first place by discouraging criminals due to high
risks of being caught.
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